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An Industry in Crisis: Nonbank Mortgage Servicers
and the CARES Act Mortgage Forbearance
I. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic levied an unprecedented hardship on
millions of Americans.1 However, certain industries have been
legislatively coaxed into bearing a much larger share of the hardship than
they had expected.2 In March 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) in response to
the overwhelming economic burden imposed by the COVID-19
pandemic.3 While the CARES Act was necessary to help homeowners
weather the COVID-19 pandemic,4 it accomplishes this by placing
mortgage servicers in a challenging position.5
The CARES Act contains a provision that allows mortgagors to
request forbearance6 on their mortgage payments for up to one year. 7
This provision is helpful to mortgagors who could not pay their bills
during the pandemic by deferring their mortgage payments for the period

1. See Karan Kaul & Laurie Goodman, The Price Tag for Keeping 29 Million Families in
Their Homes: $162 Billion, URBAN INST.: URBAN WIRE (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/price-tag-keeping-29-million-families-their-homes-162billion [https://perma.cc/2JU6-9DUB] (highlighting the economic impact the COVID-19
crisis has had on millions of Americans).
2. See Laurence Platt, Mortgage Servicers Are Getting the Short End of the Stick Under
the
CARES
Act,
HOUS.
WIRE
(June
5,
2020,
3:10
PM),
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/pulse-mortgage-servicers-are-getting-the-short-endof-the-stick-under-the-cares-act/ [https://perma.cc/S4LU-WR94] (discussing the position
mortgage servicers have been placed in by the “CARES” Act mortgage forbearance).
3. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
134 Stat. 281 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9001).
4. See Kaul & Goodman, supra note 1 (explaining the economic impact of the COVID-19
pandemic on homeowners).
5. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the position mortgage servicers have been placed in
by the “CARES” Act mortgage forbearance).
6. Forbearance, in this context, means the cessation of normally required payments under
a loan for a set period of time, but does not stop accrual of payments owed during that period.
CARES Act Mortgage Forbearance: What You Need to Know, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/coronavirus/mortgage-and-housing-assistance/cares-actmortgage-forbearance-what-you-needknow/#:~:text=Forbearance%20is%20when%20your%20mortgage,reduced%20payments%
20in%20the%20future [https://perma.cc/9E2C-E6BZ] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
7. § 4022, 134 Stat. at 490–91.
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of the forbearance. 8 In practice, the provision requires mortgage
servicers9 to continue advancing payments on mortgage-backed
securities,10 which they are contractually obligated to make although they
no longer receive payments on the underlying loans.11 As a result, the
CARES Act’s mortgage forbearance provision created a liquidity crisis
for mortgage servicers.12
Many stakeholders have highlighted the desperate need for
federal aid in the mortgage servicing industry because they recognize the
necessity of the mortgage servicing industry to the broader housing
market.13 The impact of the CARES Act will be more severe for nonbank

8. See § 4022, 134 Stat. at 490–91. (explaining the forbearance provision under Section
4022(b) of the Act); see also KARAN KAUL & TED TOZER, THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL LIQUIDITY
FACILITY
FOR
GOVERNMENT
LOAN
SERVICING
1
(2020),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102580/the-need-for-a-federalliquidity-facility-for-government-loan-servicing_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LUU-F53C]
(“[Four million two-hundred thousand] homeowners were in forbearance plans at the end of
June.”).
9. Mortgage servicing involves the collection of payments due from the borrower under a
mortgage loan and the disbursement of those funds to principal and interest balances and to
the owners or investors in the loan. Other important responsibilities of mortgage servicers
include customer service, billing, and management of delinquencies, losses, and foreclosed
properties. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, REENGINEERING NONBANK
SUPERVISION, CHAPTER THREE: OVERVIEW OF NONBANK MORTGAGE 27 (2019),
https://www.csbs.org/system/files/2020-08/chapter_three__overview_of_nonbank_mortgage_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KNK2-GMJF] (explaining the
general duties that mortgage servicers provide).
10. See Fast Answers: Mortgage Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersmortgagesecuritieshtm.html
[https://perma.cc/N856-TEZ5] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (“Mortgage-backed securities are
debt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most
commonly on residential property. Mortgage loans are purchased from banks, mortgage
companies, and other originators and then assembled into pools . . . represent[ing] claims on
the principal and interest payments made by borrowers on loans in the pool . . . .”).
11. See Platt, supra note 2 (highlighting the difficulties caused by the mortgage forbearance
of the CARES Act).
12. § 4022, 134 Stat., at 490–91; see also Platt, supra note 2 (stating that the COVID-19
environment, under the CARES Act mortgage forbearance, creates a liquidity risk).
13. See, e.g., Mike Sorohan, MBA Urges Feds to Take Immediate Further Steps on Market
Stabilization,
Liquidity,
MORTG.
BANKERS
ASS’N
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://newslink.mba.org/mba-newslinks/2020/march/mba-newslink-monday-march-232020/mba-urges-feds-to-take-urgent-steps-on-market-stabilization-liquidity/
[https://perma.cc/A4LR-JHF8] (discussing the need for liquidity and federal assistance in the
mortgage servicing industry).
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mortgage servicers 14 than for bank-owned mortgage servicers 15 because
nonbank mortgage servicers lack access to the federal lending facilities
that are available to bank servicers. 16
This Note proceeds in five parts and endeavors to suggest a
solution for nonbank mortgage servicers facing this liquidity crisis that is
both compliant with the CARES Act mortgage regulations and realistic.
Part II provides background on the mortgage servicing industry.17
Part III analyzes why the COVID-19 crisis is more damaging to nonbank
mortgage servicers than to their bank counterparts. 18 Part IV provides
suggestions for solving the problem and addresses some immediate
concerns surrounding the solution19 before briefly summarizing and
concluding in Part V.20
II. BACKGROUND OF THE MORTGAGE SERVICING INDUSTRY
A.

The Role of Mortgage Servicers

Mortgage servicers are responsible for collecting and
subsequently recording payments from mortgagors to apply to their
principal and interest balances.21 They also distribute the funds received
to the owner of the loan and toward the payment of taxes and insurance. 22
Mortgage servicers effectively support the market for mortgage-backed
securities by servicing loans that are pooled and backing the payment of
these securities.23 Nonbank mortgage servicers play a major role in the

14. Nonbank mortgage servicers are non-depository institutions that perform the function
mortgage servicing. See Roberto Hernandez et al., The Changing Dynamics of the Mortgage
Servicing Landscape 5 (Mortgage Bankers Assoc., White Paper, 2015),
https://mba.informz.net/MBA/data/images/15217_MBA_PWC_White_Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/33RY-JL6U] (defining nonbank mortgage servicer).
15. Bank-owned mortgage servicers are federal and state-chartered banks that, in their role
as a depository institution, perform mortgage servicing, often for loans they originate. Id.
16. See Platt, supra note 2 (acknowledging that no servicing advance facilities exist under
the Federal Reserve or Treasury for nonbank mortgage servicers).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9 (explaining the role
mortgage servicers play in the payment of mortgage loans).
22. See id. (explaining the responsibilities of mortgage servicers).
23. See id. (stating “remittance of payment to the applicable investors” as an integral part
of mortgage servicing).
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market for mortgage servicing rights24 (“MSRs”).25 Mortgage servicers
earn a profit by charging a servicing fee in exchange for performing all
of the previously outlined activities.26
Either the government or a mortgage lender may require a
mortgage servicer to extend a loan to a homeowner to cover principal and
interest payments that the homeowners have missed, which is paid to the
investors until the borrower can make the payments or the property is
foreclosed upon.27 This arrangement between the mortgage servicer and
the investors is referred to as a servicing advance and the payments are
referred to as advances.28 If a borrower defaults, then a mortgage servicer
will be paid through the guarantor—assuming that the loan is
guaranteed—or through foreclosure and sale of the property, which
servicers often manage. 29
Nonbank mortgage servicers are companies that are not a part of
and have no affiliations with any depository institutions, but nonetheless
engage in the business of mortgage servicing.30 Despite their integral role
in the mortgage market, nonbank mortgage servicers have not always
played a major role in mortgage servicing.31
Historically, banks and thrifts have dominated the mortgage
servicing industry.32 However, widespread thrift insolvency during the
24. “[A] Mortgage Servicing Right (MSR) is the contractual right to service a mortgage
loan; according to accounting standards, entities owning MSRs must perform a valuation
analysis and appropriately recognize the value of the MSR portfolio on the company balance
sheet.” Id. at 28.
25. See Kayla Shoemaker, Trends in Mortgage Origination and Servicing: Nonbanks in
the
Post-Crisis
Period,
13
FDIC
QUARTERLY
51,
57
(2019),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2019-vol13-4/fdic-v13n4-3q2019article3.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QQT-U5PD] (explaining the role of nonbank mortgage
servicers and investors in the MSR market).
26. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 28–29 (explaining how
mortgage servicers are compensated).
27. See Paul Jackson, Fed Looks to Ease Burden of Servicing Advances, HOUS. WIRE (Mar.
20, 2020, 9:32 AM), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/fed-looks-ease-burden-servicingadvances/#:~:text=Mortgage%20servicing%20advances%20are%20loans,property%20is%2
0sold%20out%20of [https://perma.cc/49AN-RVUP] (explaining the concept of servicing
advances).
28. See id. (defining servicing advances and the arrangement between mortgage servicers
and the owners of the loans they service).
29. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the methods of recourse for a mortgage servicer in
the event of a default); see also CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9
(explaining briefly mortgage servicers role in foreclosure proceedings).
30. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 52 (defining nonbank mortgage servicers).
31. See id. at 51–53 (explaining the historical shift in the market from bank mortgage
servicers to the prevalence of nonbank mortgage servicers).
32. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 29 (explaining the
historical dominance of banks and thrifts in mortgage servicing).
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savings and loan crisis (“S & L Crisis”) of the 1980s led to a sharp decline
in bank and thrift market share in lending, which left a void in mortgage
lending that was eventually filled by a growing number of nonbanks.33
Additionally, interest rates rose significantly in the early 1980s.34 This
had a profound negative impact on savings and loan associations because
of their practice of borrowing short term and lending long term, which
made them unable to adjust their mortgage interest rates to the rising
interest rates and competition for deposits.35 A combination of these
factors and deregulation of the savings and loan industry led to
widespread insolvency in the market.36
The S & L Crisis, combined with the rise of securitization and
mortgage-backed securities, provided nonbank mortgage servicers with
an opportunity to enter the market.37 Between the 1990s and into the
early 2000s, financial technology, such as automatic credit scoring tools
and automated loan servicing management tools, led to more efficient
mortgage servicing methods.38 These tools aided the growth and
expansion of the mortgage servicing industry for banks and nonbanks
alike.39
From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the total market for
servicing subprime loans40 doubled from $280 billion to $585 billion.41

33. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 51 (discussing the decline of banks and thrifts in
mortgage lending historically).
34. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE SAVINGS & LOAN CRISIS 7
(1992),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/102nd-congress-19911992/reports/1992_01_theeconeffectsofthesavings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Y3T-FPD2]
(discussing the increase in the interest rates in the early 1980s).
35. See id. (discussing savings and loan lending practices at the time of the crisis).
36. See id. at 7–9 (explaining how losses combined with deregulation accelerated the
crisis).
37. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 29–30 (analyzing the
factors leading to nonbank mortgage servicers entering the mortgage servicing market).
38. See Amy C. Cutts & Richard K. Green, Innovative Servicing Technology: Smart
Enough to Keep People in Their Houses? 13 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004),
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/fmwp_0403_servicing_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8RAV-C5N9] (discussing how financial technology helped lead to more
efficient mortgage servicing methods).
39. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 29 (explaining the role
of technology in the propagation of the mortgage servicing industry).
40. Subprime lending is the practice of offering loans at a rate, higher than the prime rate,
to borrowers with limited or poor credit history. Subprime Lending, OFF. OF THE
COMPTROLLER
OF
THE
CURRENCY
(last
visited
Oct.
12,
2020),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/credit/retail-credit/subprimelending.html [https://perma.cc/6XNP-3XUH].
41. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 30 (discussing the
market value of subprime loans historically).
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In 2006, nonbank mortgage servicers were responsible for approximately
33% of all mortgage servicing. 42 By 2007, the market reached $1.05
trillion before the beginning of the 2008 Financial Crisis.43 At this time,
nonbank servicers held approximately 60% of the subprime loan
servicing market.44 But the apparent success of nonbank mortgage
servicers was short-lived.45
B.

The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Impact on the Mortgage
Servicing Industry

The 2008 Financial Crisis devastated the nonbank mortgage
servicing industry.46 Many lenders and servicers faced insolvency and
bankruptcy as a result of a massive wave of borrowers being unable to
make their mortgage payments.47 Many servicers and lenders either
exited the market, involuntarily through insolvency and bankruptcy, or
merged with others to survive. 48 Nonbank mortgage servicers dropped
from approximately 33% of all mortgage servicing in 2006 to a meager
6% in 2010, effectively destroying nonbank mortgage servicers’ market
share that boomed over the prior decade. 49
This massive wave of defaults on high-risk subprime mortgages
was a catalyst for the 2008 Financial Crisis.50 The impact of these
defaults was felt by banks that had large portfolios of subprime
mortgages.51 Later investigation by the Financial Crisis Inquiry

42. See id. (discussing historical nonbank mortgage servicing trends).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 30–31 (explaining the effects of the subprime loan crisis and the impact of

the 2008 Financial Crisis on nonbank mortgage servicers).
46. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 54 (discussing widespread insolvency and economic
troubles due to the financial crisis).
47. See id. (highlighting the insolvency many nonbank mortgage servicers faced during the
financial crisis).
48. See id. (explaining the historical effect of the 2008 Financial Crisis on the mortgage
industry).
49. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 30 (announcing
statistics regarding market share of nonbank mortgage servicers after the 2008 Financial
Crisis).
50. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 256 (2011),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/79A5-YRUM] (explaining the billions in losses on subprime loans which
played a part in the 2008 Financial Crisis).
51. See id. at 256–57 (describing the impact of subprime loan losses on large banks in the
financial sector).
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Commission52 concluded that this crisis could have been avoided, but the
warning signs were ignored.53 Although the 2008 Financial Crisis and
the subprime mortgage crisis were painful blows, the country had to learn
from the experience and soldier on.54
C.

Post-Financial Crisis and the Modern Role of Mortgage
Servicers

Mortgage servicers were beginning to recover from the Financial
Crisis when a number of regulatory changes shifted the economic
landscape and allowed for increased nonbank participation in the
mortgage servicing market.55
In 2013, the Basel III56 capital
requirements for depository institutions limited the amount of mortgage
servicing rights that banks could hold.57 Mortgage servicing rights are a
type of mortgage servicing asset (“MSA”), which is considered an asset
if the net present value of the cash flows exceeds the cost to service the
asset, and a liability if the cash flows do not exceed the cost to service the
asset.58 These MSAs are risk-weighted at 100%, until they exceed a
specified statutory threshold, at which point the risk-weight is increased
to 250%, effectively requiring banks to have far more capital to comply
with regulations for MSAs beyond this capital threshold. 59
The capital requirements imposed by Basel III limited the amount
of mortgage servicing rights to a percentage of a bank’s capital, which
52. See id. at xi (“The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was created to ‘examine the
causes of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States.’”)
53. See id. at xvi (concluding that the 2008 Financial Crisis was avoidable).
54. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 32–33 (discussing the
end of the crisis and mortgage servicers recovering from the crisis).
55. See id. (highlighting the conditions which allowed for nonbank participation in the
mortgage markets).
56. Basel III is a group of proposals, proposed by the Basel Committee, that were adopted
in a final rule by U.S. bank regulators in July 2013, containing inter alia capital requirements
for banks. See generally LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 617–19 (5th ed. 2018) (providing background on the Basel III
capital ratios).
57. 12 C.F.R. § 217 (2020) (implementing Basel III capital adequacy standards to state
member banks); see also CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 32–33
(discussing the effects of Basel III regulations on the mortgage servicing market).
58. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 28 (explaining how
MSAs are kept on a balance sheet).
59. See Adam Freedman et al., The Impact of Recent Changes in Capital Requirements on
Mortgage Servicing Assets, BANK POLICY INST. (June 25, 2019), https://bpi.com/the-impactof-recent-changes-in-capital-requirements-on-mortgage-servicing-assets/
[https://perma.cc/6YE9-8HYE] (discussing the risk-weighted capital requirements for MSAs
in banks under the Basel III).
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meant banks were limited on how many of these assets they were able to
hold while staying within their required regulatory limits.60 These capital
requirements did not apply to nonbank mortgage servicers. 61 As a result,
nonbank mortgage servicers were able to gain market share with limited
competition.62 The share of nonbank mortgages issued also increased in
the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis because of their low credit
requirements, especially as compared to those of banks.63
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, many nonbank mortgage
servicers and originators grew in market share.64 During the first quarter
of 2020, the nonbank share of agency servicers65 had grown to 53% of
the agency servicing market, up from just 24% in 2014. 66 This growing
market share is attributed to the ability of nonbanks to specialize and
reduce the costs associated with servicing loans.67 One form of
specialization which aided in the proliferation of nonbank mortgage
servicers was the introduction of enhanced technology to the mortgage
servicing industry.68 For example, the implementation of online
services—which automatically collect information pertaining to a
borrower’s financial status and history—allows a lender to more quickly
and efficiently make an approval decision based on these online
applications 69
60. See id. (explaining the impact of minimum capital standards adopted from the Basel
III on bank mortgage servicers).
61. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 33 (explaining the
emergence of nonbank mortgage servicers in the mortgage servicing market post-crisis).
62. See id. (explaining the emergence of nonbank mortgage servicers into the mortgage
servicing market post-crisis).
63. See You Suk Kim et al., Mapping the Boom in Nonbank Mortgage Lending—and
Understanding the Risks, BROOKINGS (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2018/09/10/mapping-the-boom-in-nonbank-mortgage-lending-and-understanding-therisks/ [https://perma.cc/NA2K-42H8] (analyzing nonbank mortgage issuing practices as
compared to banks post-financial crisis).
64. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 54 (discussing market share for nonbank mortgage
originators and servicers).
65. Agency servicers are those who service loans guaranteed by government sponsored
entities or the Government National Mortgage Loan Association. CONFERENCE OF STATE
BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 55.
66. See id. (announcing statistics of nonbank mortgage servicers share of agency servicing
in the market).
67. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 55 (analyzing factors for increased market share for
nonbank mortgage servicers post-crisis).
68. See id. (stating that technological innovation played a role in the growth of the nonbank
market post-crisis).
69.See ANDREAS FUSTER ET AL., THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN MORTGAGE LENDING, 1
(2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr836.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TB5F-DR7Z] (explaining the role of technology in the mortgage servicing
industry).
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III. LIQUIDITY SHORTAGE FOR NONBANK MORTGAGE SERVICERS
A.

The CARES Act Mortgage Forbearance Ramifications for
Mortgage Servicers

The CARES Act provided a $2.2 trillion economic stimulus
package, passed with the express purpose of addressing the economic
crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 70 The Act contains a provision
that is particularly disadvantageous to mortgage servicers, stating that,
“[d]uring the covered period, a borrower with a [f]ederally backed
mortgage loan experiencing a financial hardship due, directly or
indirectly, to the COVID-19 emergency may request forbearance on the
[f]ederally backed mortgage loan, regardless of delinquency status.”71
For a borrower to obtain forbearance, the borrower is only required to
request forbearance from the mortgage servicer, and confirm that the
“financial hardship” is a result of the COVID-19 crisis.72 The provision
states that, “[u]pon receiving a request for forbearance from a borrower .
. . the servicer shall with no additional documentation required other than
the borrower’s attestation to a financial hardship caused by the COVID19 emergency . . . provide the forbearance.”73 This period of forbearance
is to last an initial 180-days and at the borrower’s request may be
extended up to an additional 180-days, subject to the borrower’s right to
shorten this period at the borrower’s election.74 There are additional
provisions relevant to mortgage servicers under the CARES Act which
grant a limited forbearance to multifamily borrowers with federally
backed loans. 75 Another relevant provision mandates a 120-day period
from the enactment of the act that prevents any eviction proceedings
against any tenants with, among other things, a federally backed
mortgage loan.76
70. See generally Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security ("CARES”) Act, Pub.
L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9001); see also What’s in
the $2 Trillion Coronavirus Relief Package?, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Mar.
25,
2020),
http://www.crfb.org/blogs/whats-2-trillion-coronavirus-relief-package
[https://perma.cc/YP5S-EX8A] (discussing the “CARES” Act allocation of funds and the
purpose of the Act).
71. § 4022, 134 Stat. at 490–91.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See § 4023, 134 Stat. at 491–492 (allowing multifamily mortgage servicers to request
forbearance due to a COVID-19 related financial hardship and sets forth the relevant
restrictions to the provision).
76. See § 4024, 134 Stat. at 492–494 (providing a federal moratorium on eviction filings).
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On December 27, 2020, Congress enacted the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”)77, which provides for an
extension of the eviction moratorium78 and emergency rental assistance
payments.79 While incredibly helpful to renters, it does little to address
the real issue that this pandemic has levied against mortgage servicers for
the prior nine months of forbearance. 80
The statutory right of forbearance provided to the nation’s
homeowners, landlords, and tenants has disrupted the stream of payments
to mortgage servicers.81 This disruption places servicers between the
borrowers and the owners of the loans, where they cannot collect
payments on the mortgages they service.82 Furthermore, the CARES Act
does nothing to address the fact that mortgage servicers are still
contractually obligated to continue making payments to the owners of the
mortgage-backed securities on the loans they service.83
In the case of mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the
Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), 84 the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), 85 or the
77. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116-260 (2020).
78. See Consolidated Appropriations Act § 502 (“The order issued by the Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention . . . entitled ‘Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions To
Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19’ . . . is extended through January 31, 2021,
notwithstanding the effective dates specified in such Order.”).
79. See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act § 501 (providing emergency funding
for the purposes of rental assistance to individuals who are struggling financially because of
the COVID-19 pandemic).
80. See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116-260, § 501–02
(2020); see also Platt, supra note 2 (“[M]ortgage servicers are required to shoulder the shortterm financial burden of the natural consequences of providing forbearance to such residential
mortgage borrowers without, in the views of many, the benefit of just compensation from the
federal government.”).
81. See Platt, supra note 2 (stating that the CARES Act mortgage forbearance has disrupted
mortgage servicers payment streams).
82. See id. (discussing how the mortgage forbearance provision has disrupted the payments
mortgage servicers expected to receive).
83. See id. (explaining the “unfair” position mortgage servicers have been placed in by the
CARES Act mortgage forbearance).
84. The Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) is a government sponsored
enterprise that purchases and guarantees single family mortgage loans, issues debt securities
to investors, and converts multifamily mortgage loans into MBS, which provides liquidity to
the market. See What We Do, FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae.com/about-us/what-wedo [https://perma.cc/969P-9TSM] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (explaining Fannie Mae’s
function and business activities).
85. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) is a government
sponsored enterprise that buys mortgage loans on the secondary market and sells them as
MBS to provide liquidity to the market.
See Our Business, FREDDIE MAC,
http://www.freddiemac.com/about/business/ [https://perma.cc/FF2R-V325] (last visited Oct.
12, 2020) (explaining Freddie Mac’s function and business activities).
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Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”), 86 mortgage
servicers are required to make scheduled payments to the holders of those
securities.87 However, the mortgage servicers are no longer receiving
payments from mortgagors who invoked forbearance, creating a liquidity
challenge for mortgage servicers. 88 Under the CARES Act mortgage
forbearance, mortgage servicers are only temporarily denied funds they
are due as the servicers of their loans.89 Therefore, the concern is the
immediate impact of the forbearance. 90 Mortgage servicers could not
have predicted that they would be unable to collect those payments due
to a legislative action designed to protect the interests of mortgagors.91
Mortgage servicers now bear the economic risk of borrowers’
forbearance, which was not considered when they entered into servicing
agreements.92
In April 2020, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”)
announced that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would limit the servicer
obligation to advance mortgage-backed securities payments to four
months for loans in forbearance. 93 While the FHFA’s actions are helpful
to mortgage servicers, a liquidity facility is still needed to handle the large
number of loans in forbearance and resolve the four months for which
mortgage servicers will still be required to cover payments on mortgage-

86. The Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”) provides guarantees
on the “timely payment of principal and interest on MBS backed by federally insured or
guaranteed
loans.”
Funding
Government
Lending,
GINNIE
MAE,
https://www.ginniemae.gov/about_us/who_we_are/Pages/funding_government_lending.asp
x [https://perma.cc/DN3N-ZZUB] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
87. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the payments due under MBS guaranteed by
government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”) like Fannie Mae, which requires principal and
interest, and Freddie Mac, which requires only interest be advanced).
88. See id. (discussing that mortgage servicers are not receiving payments under the
forbearance provision of the CARES Act).
89. See id. (discussing the short-term liquidity risks for mortgage servicers created by the
CARES Act mortgage forbearance).
90. See id. (discussing the short-term impact of the mortgage forbearance on mortgage
servicers).
91. See id. (discussing the inability of mortgage servicers to account for the risk of a
pandemic).
92.See id. (“[Mortgage servicers] did not realistically contemplate the impacts of required
forbearance for the significant number of loans impacted by the global pandemic in allocating
the risks in the servicing agreements.”).
93.See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Addresses Servicer Liquidity
Concerns, Announces Four Month Advance Obligation Limit for Loans in Forbearance (Apr.
21, 2020), https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Addresses-ServicerLiquidity-Concerns-Announces-Four-Month-Advance-Obligation-Limit-for-Loans-inForbearance.aspx [https://perma.cc/PY6U-HXHW] (announcing a cap to mortgage servicer
payment advancing obligations for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).

260

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

backed securities.94 The fact that there is a limit to the amount that
mortgage servicers will be required to advance does not negate the four
months of payment that servicers are burdened with in the meantime. 95
Furthermore, if mortgage servicers are expected to advance payments for
four months of the potentially one year forbearance period, short-term
liquidity issues are almost a certainty.96
B.

The Disproportionate Impact of the Mortgage Forbearance on
Nonbank Mortgage Servicers

The CARES Act mortgage forbearance impacts nonbank
mortgage servicers more severely than bank mortgage servicers because
they do not benefit from the federal safety nets and lending facilities that
safeguard the stability of banks.97 Banks have deposit insurance provided
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and have access
to the Federal Reserve as the “lender of last resort”98 which provides
banks with liquidity through discount window lending for both short-term
and more severe liquidity needs.99 No such comparable lending facilities
currently exist for nonbank mortgage servicers. 100
Nonbank mortgage servicers also tend to have fewer
“unencumbered assets” than banks do in the event of a liquidity

94. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (discussing why the four-month cap by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac is not necessarily going to completely solve the crisis).
95. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the short-term financial burden that mortgage
servicers are being forced to bear under the CARES Act mortgage forbearance).
96. See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, supra note 93 (announcing a four-month
cap to mortgage servicer payment advancing obligations); see also Platt, supra note 2
(discussing the liquidity issues likely to arise for mortgage servicers under the forbearance).
97. See Joe Light, Mortgage Firms Teeter Near Crisis That Regulators Saw Coming,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0403/mortgage-servicers-teeter-near-crisis-that-regulators-saw-coming
[https://perma.cc/Y98H-7GYR] (discussing nonbank mortgage lenders lack of federal
assistance compared to banks).
98. A lender of last resort is an institution that provides liquidity insurance to the system it
supports. See Paul Tucker, Re-Thinking the Lender of Last Resort 12–13 (Bank for Int’l
Settlements, BIS Papers No. 79, 2014), https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap79.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UUM8-Z6LX] (describing the role of a “lender of last resort”).
99. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 56, at 175 (explaining the role of the discount
window and deposit insurance in reducing risk to banks); see also Discount Window Lending,
FED. RES. BD. (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-window.htm
[https://perma.cc/SG9R-RGKW] (explaining the purpose and function of the discount
window).
100. See Platt, supra note 2 (acknowledging that no servicing advance facilities exist under
the Federal Reserve or Treasury for nonbank mortgage servicers).
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shortage.101
Unencumbered assets are not used to collateralize
transactions, are available to convert into cash for funding purposes, and
are not restricted from being used as a liquidity buffer.102 This relatively
low amount of unencumbered assets leaves less of a buffer in the event
of a liquidity crisis.103 The CARES Act mortgage forbearance therefore
has a more severe effect on nonbank mortgage servicers.104 The liquidity
risk presented will likely put strain on the resources of most nonbank
mortgage servicers because they did not consider this risk when they
entered into their servicing agreements.105
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

Establish a Liquidity Facility to Provide for the Short-Term
Credit Needs of Nonbank Mortgage Servicers

The CARES Act mortgage forbearance covered 70% of all
single-family mortgages with an unpaid principal balance of $7 trillion.106
By the end of June 2020, over 4.2 million homeowners took advantage
of the forbearance provided by the Act.107 Nonbank mortgage servicers
are a significant portion of the total mortgage servicing market. 108 At the
101. See Kim et al., supra note 63 (stating that nonbanks have fewer unencumbered assets
than banks do).
102. See General Instructions: 2052b Report, FED. RES. BD. 6 (2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_2052b20151231_i.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4NX-ZGES] (defining unencumbered assets).
103. See Kim et al., supra note 63 (explaining that nonbank mortgage servicers have fewer
unencumbered assets than bank mortgage servicers); see also Platt, supra note 2
(acknowledging that no servicing advance facilities exist under the Federal Reserve or
Treasury for nonbank mortgage servicers).
104. See Kim et al., supra note 63 (explaining that nonbank mortgage servicers have fewer
unencumbered assets than bank mortgage servicers); see also Platt, supra note 2
(acknowledging that no servicing advance facilities exist under the Fed or Treasury for
nonbank mortgage servicers).
105. See Platt, supra note 2 (“[T]his liquidity risk likely strains the resources of most
nonbank mortgage servicers, not because they lack financial strength, but because the parties
did not realistically contemplate the impacts of required forbearance”).
106. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (announcing statistics regarding the potential scope
of the CARES Act mortgage forbearance).
107. Id.
108. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, PROPOSED REGULATORY PRUDENTIAL
STANDARDS
FOR
NON-BANK
MORTGAGE
SERVICERS
7
(2020),
https://www.csbs.org/system/files/2020-09/FinalProposedPrudentialStandardsForComment2020_1.pdf#:~:text=Nonbank%20mortgage%20servicing%20companies%20perform,Fanni
e%20Mae%20and%20Freddie%20Mac [https://perma.cc/P23J-WEL4] [hereinafter CSBS
2020] (analyzing statistics of nonbank mortgage servicers prevalence in the agency servicing
market).
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beginning of 2020, nonbank mortgage servicers were responsible for
servicing 53% of the agency servicing market. 109
The primary issue for nonbank mortgage servicers is a lack of
liquidity to pay the principal and interest due on mortgage-backed
securities.110 A liquidity facility to lend to these servicers would alleviate
the overwhelming burden imposed by the CARES Act mortgage
forbearance provision.111 This would allow nonbank mortgage servicers
to continue to comply with the requirements of the CARES Act while
allowing them to pay the owners of government mortgage-backed
securities that they service.112
The lending facility could be established by the Federal
Reserve. 113 Under the authority granted by Federal Reserve Act Section
13(3) (“Section 13(3)”), the Federal Reserve Board can establish a
lending facility in “unusual or exigent circumstances.”114 Pursuant to
changes to Section 13(3) under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act,115 the facility would also need to have “broadbased eligibility.”116 The facility would also need to grant liquidity to the
financial system broadly, “secured sufficiently to protect taxpayers from
losses,” with “the prior approval of the Secretary of the Treasury,” and to
be wound up in a “timely and orderly fashion.”117 The Federal Reserve
has established that “broad-based” means a facility that “at least five
entities” could qualify for, and that is not designed to save failing firms.118
109. See id. (announcing statistics of nonbank mortgage servicers share of agency
servicing in the market).
110. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (discussing mortgage servicer liquidity concerns).
111. See id. at 8 (recommending a liquidity facility to fund government mortgage-backed
securities advancements for mortgage servicers to address liquidity concerns).
112. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116136, 134 Stat. 281, 490–91 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9056); see KAUL & TOZER,
supra note 8, at 8 (arguing for a liquidity facility to cover government mortgage-backed
securities advancements).
113. See generally Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343(3) (2018).
114. Id.
115. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101(a), 12
U.S.C. § 343(3) (2018) (amending the authority granted under Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act).
116. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING 18 (2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44185.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLN8-S269] (stating the “broad
based eligibility” requirement for an emergency lending facility under Section 13(3)).
117. See id. (stating other requirements for an emergency lending facility under Section
13(3)).
118. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Board Approves Final Rule
Specifying Its Procedures for Emergency Lending Under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act
(Nov.
30,
2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20151130a.htm
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The Federal Reserve has already established lending facilities pursuant to
its authority under Section 13(3), and there is clear statutory authority for
another lending facility to be established in this fashion. 119
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) is a credit
facility established under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.120
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York committed to lend to a special
purpose vehicle (“SPV”)121 on a “recourse basis,” and the Treasury
agreed to take a $10 billion equity investment in the SPV.122 The SPV
would function by purchasing “three-month U.S. dollar-denominated
commercial paper” from issuers subject to certain restrictions.123 The
intended effect is to increase the flow of credit and to provide liquidity to
businesses in the commercial paper market.124
The lending facility suggested herein would work in a similar
fashion to the CPFF.125 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York would
lend to a mortgage servicer SPV, and the Treasury would agree to take
an equity investment in the SPV.126 The amounts invested would depend
on the exact liquidity needs at the time the facility is established. 127 This
SPV would then extend lines of credit directly to nonbank mortgage

[https://perma.cc/B3CR-TV6L] (defining “broad-based” within the understanding of “broadbased eligibility” within Section 13(3)).
119. See FED. RESERVE BD., PERIODIC REPORT: UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING LENDING
FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT
2 (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/pdcf-mmlf-cpff-pmccf-smccftalf-mlf-ppplf-msnlf-mself-mslpf-nonlf-noelf-9-8-20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C7S7-N2JG]
(reporting regarding the lending facilities established in response to the COVID-19 crisis
under Federal Reserve Act § 13(3)).
120. FED. RESERVE BD., COMMERCIAL PAPER FUNDING FACILITY: PROGRAM TERMS AND
CONDITIONS
1
(2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/monetary20200723a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/84XW-HUVP].
121. A special purpose vehicle is a legal entity created by a company or organization with
its own assets, liabilities, and legal status. What is a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)?, CORP.
FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/strategy/specialpurpose-vehicle-spv/ [https://perma.cc/EUL2-NN3Q] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021).
122. FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 120.
123. See id. (stating the business of the facility and how it will function).
124. See Commercial Paper Funding Facility, FED. RES. BD. (Dec. 11, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/cpff.htm
[https://perma.cc/U9C5-5N64]
(explaining the intended purpose of the credit facility).
125. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (suggesting liquidity facility along the lines of CPFF
for government loan servicers).
126. See FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 120 (discussing structure of the CPFF).
127. See id. (explaining the mechanics of the CPFF); see also KAUL & TOZER, supra note
8, at 8 (suggesting liquidity facility along the lines of CPFF for government loan servicers
and proposing that the Treasury take an equity position to absorb credit losses).
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servicers of federally backed mortgage loans that qualify for forbearance
under the CARES Act, subject to certain conditions.128
This facility would only be available for nonbank mortgage
servicers, although bank mortgage servicers are also struggling.129 This
facility should be enacted to prevent the collapse on the nonbank
mortgage servicing industry because this industry lacks the liquidity
safety nets available to bank mortgage servicers. 130 This facility should
be enacted to minimize the required resources and effectively triage the
servicers most in need of liquidity.131 A liquidity facility must exist for
nonbank mortgage servicers during economic crises to avoid straining the
liquidity of the housing market, and this facility can be a template for
solving this problem in the future.132 This facility will not run afoul of
the Federal Reserve’s rule regarding “broad-based eligibility” as long as
the facility is used for the purpose of preventing the collapse of the
industry as a whole.133
The CARES Act provides for funding for such a liquidity facility
by creating a Treasury fund of $454 billion to be invested in Federal
Reserve emergency facilities.134 The CARES Act provides that the
funds, “shall be available to make loans and loan guarantees to . . .
facilities established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.”135 The purpose of these funds is to, “provide liquidity to the
financial system that supports lending to eligible businesses, States, or
municipalities.”136

128. See FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 120 (explaining function of special purpose vehicle
in the CPFF); see also KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8, at 8 (suggesting banks extend lines of
credit to be purchased by Ginnie Mae issuers).
129. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the suffering of all mortgage servicers under the
forbearance).
130. See Light, supra note 97 (discussing nonbank mortgage lenders lack of federal
assistance compared to banks and potential crisis looming).
131. See id. (discussing the difficulties of nonbank mortgage servicers in the current crisis);
see also Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the suffering of mortgage servicers under the
forbearance generally).
132. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (stating that a liquidity crisis is coming and can be
addressed by establishing a liquidity facility).
133. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 118 (defining “broad-based” within
the understanding of “broad-based eligibility” within Section 13(3)).
134. See Peter Conti-Brown, Explaining the New Fed-Treasury Emergency Fund,
BROOKINGS (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/explaining-the-new-fedtreasury-emergency-fund/ [https://perma.cc/7QSE-A55D] (explaining the CARES Act
creation of a Treasury fund for Federal Reserve emergency facilities).
135. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116136, 134 Stat. 281, 470 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9042).
136. Id.
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The Treasury is given further authority under the CARES Act to
appropriate funds in the Exchange Stabilization Fund137 for the purposes
of funding any emergency facilities established under the Act. 138 As of
July 2020, the Treasury reported that there was $482 billion left in the
Exchange Stabilization Fund, and in September 2020, the Treasury
pledged $195 billion to support emergency facilities established by the
Federal Reserve.139
However, when the Relief Act was signed into law, it
permanently rescinded the “unobligated balances made available under
Section 4027 of the CARES Act.”140 Additionally, the Relief Act
amended the CARES Act, and starting after December 31, 2020, it
prevents the Federal Reserve from funding any Section 13(3) facilities
pursuant to Section 4003(b)(4) of the CARES Act.141 As a result, the
contemplated facility will likely require additional legislation to be
allocated funding; however, that is almost certainly a worthwhile goal. 142
Because of the severe impact the failure of nonbank mortgage servicers
would have on the broader economy, providing liquidity to these
businesses is essential, and the CARES Act, at one point, provided
funding for exactly this purpose.143
In March 2020, the Mortgage Bankers Association (“MBA”)
estimated that, if one-quarter of eligible borrowers chose to invoke the
forbearance for six months, mortgage servicers would be required to
137. The Exchange Stabilization Fund is established under 31 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(1) for the
purposes of “. . . investing in obligations of the United States Government . . .,” amounts in
the fund that are not required to carry out the acts therein at the time they are passed, with the
approval of the President. 31 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(1) (2018).
138. § 4027, 134 Stat. at 496–97.
139. See MARC LABONTE ET AL., HOW MUCH MONEY REMAINS UNDER TITLE IV OF THE
CARES
ACT?
1
(2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11512#:~:text=As%20shown%20in%20Fi
gure%201,to%20%241%2C950%20billion%20to%20recipients.
[https://perma.cc/JRJ84JEH] (announcing funds remaining in the ESF and the Treasury’s plans going forward).
140. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116-260, § 1003(a)(1) (2020)
(“[T]he unobligated balances made available under section 4027 of the CARES Act (15
U.S.C. 9061), $429,000,000,000 shall be permanently rescinded on the date of enactment of
this Act.”).
141. See Consolidated Appropriations Act § 1005(c)(1) (“After December 31, 2020, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve banks shall not
make any loan, purchase any obligation, asset, security, or other interest, or make any
extension of credit through any program or facility established under section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act . . . in which the Secretary made a loan, loan guarantee, or other
investment pursuant to section 4003(b)(4) . . .”).
142. See, e.g., Light, supra note 97 (discussing generally the potential risk posed to the
financial system by nonbank mortgage servicers failures).
143. § 4003(b)(4), 134 Stat. at 470; see generally Sorohan, supra note 13.
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advance upwards of $75 to $100 billion to investors.144 The number of
mortgages in forbearance peaked on June 15, 2020, with 8.55% of
mortgage loans in forbearance or approximately 4.3 million
homeowners. 145 This number has subsequently declined, reaching 5.38%
or roughly 2.7 million homeowners by February 1, 2021.146 This falls
short of the estimated one-quarter of homeowners used in projections by
the MBA, and well within the financial scope of the Treasury’s funds
allocated by the CARES Act for this purpose.147 However, simply
because the COVID-19 crisis has not been as devastating as the initially
projected figures, there is no reason to believe it will not be in the
future.148 This should be seen as a near miss with tragedy, and a better
reason to create some framework to support nonbank mortgage servicers
in times of crisis.149
B.

Strengthen Existing Federal Oversight and Increase Regulatory
Measures

The authority to oversee nonbank mortgage servicers currently
lies with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).150 The
CFPB is responsible for supervising depository institutions with over $10
billion in assets and any affiliated companies, in addition to nonbank

144. Sorohan, supra note 13.
145. See Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, Share of Mortgage Loans in Forbearance

Increases to 8.55% (June 15, 2020), https://www.mba.org/2020-press-releases/june/share-ofmortgage-loans-in-forbearance-increases-to-855
[https://perma.cc/XAA6-XC3H]
(announcing mortgage forbearance statistics the week of June 15, 2020).
146. See Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, Share of Mortgage Loans in Forbearance
Remains Unchanged at 5.38 Percent (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.mba.org/2021-pressreleases/february/share-of-mortgage-loans-in-forbearance-remains-unchanged-at-538percent [https://perma.cc/SEE8-AE5F] (announcing mortgage forbearance statistics the week
of Feb. 1, 2021).
147. § 4003(b)(4), 134 Stat. at 470; see also MARC LABONTE ET AL., supra note 139
(announcing Treasury’s pledge of $195 billion to emergency facilities). But see Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116-260, § 1003(a)(1) (2020) (rescinding funding
granted under the CARES Act).
148. See Sorohan, supra note 13 (discussing the predicted figures of one-quarter of eligible
borrowers invoking forbearance).
149. See id. (discussing the lack of structure to help nonbank mortgage servicers).
150. See Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 § 626(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5538(a) (2018) (“The
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection shall have the authority to prescribe rules with
respect to mortgage loans . . . [and] enforce [those] rules . . . in the same manner, by the same
means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties, as though all applicable terms and
provisions of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 were incorporated into and made
part of this subsection.”).
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mortgage originators and servicers. 151 CFPB oversight is supervisory in
nature, and aimed at protecting consumers from “unfair or deceptive act
or practices regarding mortgage loans.”152
The Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) stated that the CFPB lacked any means
to create a list of nonbank mortgage servicers, and therefore, the CFPB
does not have a full record of the companies under the scope of its
regulation.153 The inability to identify the regulated nonbank mortgage
servicers indicates a need for more comprehensive oversight of nonbank
mortgage servicers under the CFPB.154
Moreover, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (“CSBS”)
proposed regulatory standards for nonbank mortgage servicers. 155 These
standards covered a broad range of topics, including capital and liquidity
requirements. 156 For larger nonbank mortgage servicers, CSBS has
proposed a risk-weighted capital requirement. 157 This new requirement,
combined with proposed liquidity requirements, would help to limit the
amount of risk that nonbank mortgage servicers can be subjected to and
would insulate nonbank mortgage servicers from challenging economic
situations.158
The crisis to mortgage servicers was not caused directly by the
COVID-19 crisis.159 Rather, this crisis was caused when the CARES Act

151. Institutions Subject to CFPB Supervisory Authority, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/guidance/supervisionexaminations/institutions/ [https://perma.cc/BNM2-3F8F] (last visited Jan. 5, 2021).
152. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 § 626(a).
153. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-278, NONBANK MORTGAGE
SERVICERS: EXISTING REGULATORY OVERSIGHT COULD BE STRENGTHENED 48 (2016),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675747.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9VR-CKE3] (analyzing the
sufficiency of existing CFPB oversight and regulatory authority).
154. See id. (stating that CFPB lacks the ability to collect data on the identity of all nonbank
servicers, in part because of a lack of federal regulation prior to the creation of the CFPB).
155. See Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 65 (stating the CSBS has proposed regulatory
standards for nonbank mortgage servicers).
156. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, PROPOSED REGULATORY PRUDENTIAL
STANDARDS
FOR
NON-BANK
MORTGAGE
SERVICERS
7
(2015),
https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/MSRProposedRegulatoryPrudentialStandardsforNon-BankMortgageServicers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QM9H-3XDL] [hereinafter CSBS 2015] (proposing regulatory standards
for capital and liquidity).
157. See id. at 13–14 (“State regulators see a need for [nonbank mortgage servicing firms]
to have in place advanced risk management and management information systems to mitigate
risk.”).
158. See id. (proposing regulatory standards for risk-weighted capital and liquidity
requirements to minimize likelihood of harm from financial hardships).
159. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing how legislative action has burdened mortgage
servicers with the economic strain of the mortgage forbearance).
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required mortgage servicers to shoulder the burden of ensuring the safety
and security of mortgagors, whose forbearance was unforeseeable, 160
through legislation.161 Unlike the 2008 Financial Crisis, the current crisis
was not caused by large scale defaults in the mortgage market, but rather
a disruption of expected payments.162 The mortgage servicing industry
would not be in its current position but for the passage of the CARES
Act’s mortgage forbearance provision.163
The COVID-19 crisis was also a far greater threat than what was
contemplated in the increased stress testing scenarios, proposed by
Ginnie Mae, to be imposed on nonbank mortgage lenders. 164 This
suggests that regulation alone would not have prevented this mortgage
servicer liquidity crisis if no lending facility exists to support the industry
in times of crisis.165 However, even if increased regulation could have
conceivably avoided the liquidity crisis that nonbank mortgage servicers
are facing, regulators did not take the necessary steps to implement
regulations in the lead up to the COVID-19 crisis.166
Therefore, as a condition of access to the liquidity facility, there
should be a mandatory assent to increased regulatory oversight of the
nonbank mortgage servicers that choose to take advantage of the
facility.167 However, the oversight must be greater than what the CFPB
currently provides because these institutions need regulations that will
promote soundness and limit the risk that they can pose to the
economy.168 Additionally, there should be an assent to increased capital
and liquidity standards, as contemplated by the CSBS, in order to ensure
that risk mitigation is a part of the regulatory solution.169 This will help
160. See id. (discussing how mortgage servicers are getting an unfair deal as a result of the
CARES Act legislation and mortgage forbearance).
161. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No.
116-136, 134 Stat. 281, 490–91 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9056) (discussing how
the mortgage forbearance was the result of legislation in response to a crisis).
162. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing how the mortgage forbearance disrupted payments
to mortgage servicers); see also Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 54 (stating that the financial
crisis was caused by large scale defaults on subprime loans).
163. § 4022, 134 Stat. at 490–91; see generally Platt, supra note 2.
164. See Light, supra note 97 (discussing Ginnie Mae’s proposed stress tests being less
severe than the COVID-19 crisis).
165. See id. (discussing Ginnie Mae’s proposed stress tests being less severe than the
COVID-19 crisis, and implicitly arguing that proposed regulations would not have prevented
crisis).
166. See id. (highlighting regulatory inaction regarding nonbank mortgage servicers lack
of credit and liquidity in preparation for crisis).
167. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 153.
168. See Light, supra note 97 (discussing the risk posed by nonbank mortgage servicers).
169. See generally CSBS 2015, supra note 156.
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ensure that dangerous economic situations such as the COVID-19
pandemic and the 2008 Financial Crisis do not bring nonbank mortgage
servicers to the brink of collapse every time they occur. 170
C.

Responses to Criticisms and Potential Concerns

The primary criticism against establishing a liquidity facility for
nonbank mortgage servicers contemplates the likelihood that nonbank
mortgage servicers will evade the natural consequences of their own
actions.171 No one anticipated the scope and scale of the COVID-19
crisis, but regulators were aware of the potential for a nonbank liquidity
crisis.172 Nonbank mortgage servicers even lobbied against stricter
regulations and “stress testing”173 requirements being placed on them,
arguing that their rising participation in the mortgage market did not pose
a risk to the broader financial system.174
The housing industry is heavily reliant on nonbank mortgage
servicers.175 The Secretary of the Treasury has announced the creation of
a “task force” within the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”)
to monitor nonbank mortgage servicers as a potential systemic risk to the
broader economy, however, there has not yet been a public report on their
findings.176 Federally backed mortgages constitute approximately 70%
of all single family loans, a total of over 33 million loans.177 As of 2020,
170. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 153.
171. See Light, supra note 97 (discussing the foreseeability and general criticism of

“bailing out” nonbank mortgage servicers).
172. See id. (highlighting regulators’ awareness of the risk posed by nonbank mortgage
servicers).
173. Stress tests are scenarios designed to analyze the impact of a given event on the
financial health and liquidity of the tested entity or company. See GINNIE MAE, REQUEST FOR
INPUT:
STRESS
TESTING
FRAMEWORK
2,
5,
7–8,
27
(2019),
https://www.ginniemae.gov/newsroom/publications/Documents/ginniemae_rfi_stress_testin
g.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPL2-EEFD] (“The Version 1 stress testing framework forecasts an
issuer’s financial performance over the next eight quarters under a base and an adverse
scenario . . .”).
174. See Light, supra note 97 (discussing how nonbank mortgage servicers lobbied against
increased regulations for capital and liquidity requirements).
175. See KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8 (analyzing statistics regarding the scope of the
mortgage forbearance provision); see also Shoemaker, supra note 25, at 54 (analyzing the
prevalence of nonbank mortgage servicers post-financial crisis).
176. Jesse Westbrook, Mnuchin Forms Task Force to Confront Mortgage Firms’ Liquidity,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2020, 4:37 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0326/mnuchin-forms-task-force-to-confront-mortgage-firms-liquidity [https://perma.cc/LJ8HHCPF]; see Sorohan, supra note 13 (expanding on point made by Secretary of Treasury
regarding nonbank mortgage servicers impact on the economy).
177. KAUL & TOZER, supra note 8.
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nonbank mortgage servicers held 53% of the agency servicing market,
which is comprised of federally backed loans. 178 Regardless of the
culpability of nonbank mortgage servicers for the current crisis, with this
large of a portion of the market share of mortgage servicing activities they
cannot be allowed to fail in their current state or they could risk the
instability of the entire housing market.179
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, nonbank mortgage servicers are a substantial portion
of the modern mortgage servicing market.180 The COVID-19 pandemic
has had a profound and substantial negative impact on this industry.181
However, the mortgage servicing industry was unfairly burdened with the
responsibility of shouldering the mortgage forbearance provision of the
CARES Act, which they could not have reasonably anticipated.182 As a
result of intentional legislation, nonbank mortgage servicers are facing a
liquidity crisis that they are not equipped to deal with.183 Furthermore,
their failure could potentially cause the entire market to collapse because
of the substantial role nonbank mortgage servicers play in the housing
market.184

178. See CSBS 2020, supra note 108 (discussing the statistics of nonbank mortgage
servicers share of agency servicing in the market and the how the agency servicing market
ties in with federally backed mortgage loans).
179.See THOMAS WADE, AM. ACTION FORUM, THE CARES ACT AND MORTGAGE
SERVICERS
2–3
(2020),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/print/?url=https://www.americanactionforum.org/insi
ght/the-cares-act-and-mortgage-servicers/ [https://perma.cc/W6CM-62YM] (arguing for
relief for mortgage servicers for fears of larger and more systemic threat to the housing market
and economy as a whole).
180. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 34 (announcing
statistics regarding substantial market share of nonbank mortgage servicers in the MSR &
agency servicing market).
181. See Kaul & Goodman, supra note 1 (analyzing the allocation of the funds provided to
offset the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the economy); see also KAUL & TOZER, supra
note 8.
182. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116136, 134 Stat. 281, 490-91 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9056); see Platt, supra note
2 (discussing the unfair negative impact of the CARES Act mortgage forbearance provision
on mortgage servicers).
183. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the legislative burden placed on mortgage servicers
by the CARES Act).
184. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 34 (highlighting the
substantial market share of nonbank mortgage servicers); see also WADE, AM. ACTION
FORUM, supra note 179, at 2–3 (highlighting concerns of a collapse of the housing market).
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Therefore, a mortgage servicing facility should be established
because it would provide liquidity to nonbank mortgage servicers to help
them survive the COVID-19 crisis.185 Nonbank mortgage servicers are
in a worse position than bank mortgage servicers, who have safety nets
to help them withstand this liquidity crisis.186 Although the contemplated
facility will not directly benefit bank mortgage servicers, it is in the best
interest of everyone involved to help nonbank mortgage servicers manage
this liquidity shortage and avoid the fallout of allowing them to fail.187
NICKOLAS HARRELSON*

185. See Platt, supra note 2 (discussing the unfair negative impact of the “CARES” Act
mortgage forbearance provision on mortgage servicers).
186. See Light, supra note 97 (emphasizing nonbank mortgage lenders lack of federal
“safety nets” compared to banks and potential crisis looming).
187. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, supra note 9, at 34 (announcing
statistics regarding substantial market share of nonbank mortgage servicers); see also WADE,
AM. ACTION FORUM, supra note 179, at 2–3 (arguing for relief for mortgage servicers to
prevent systemic threat to the economy).
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